Why corporations in developing countries are likely to be even more susceptible to the vicissitudes of international finance than their counterparts in the developed world: A Tribute to Ajit Singh by Palma, J. G.
 UNIVERSITY OF
CAMBRIDGE
Cambridge Working 
Papers in Economics 
 
Why corporations in developing countries are likely to be 
even more susceptible to the vicissitudes of international 
finance than their counterparts in the developed world:  
A Tribute to Ajit Singh  
 
 
 
 
José Gabriel Palma 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
08 December 2015 
CWPE 1539 
 1
Why corporations in developing countries are likely to be 
even more susceptible to the vicissitudes of international 
finance than their counterparts in the developed world: 
A Tribute to Ajit Singh1  
 
José Gabriel Palma 
Faculty of Economics,  
University of Cambridge2 
Cambridge Working Paper in Economics (CWPE) 1539 
 (Available at http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/research/repec/cam/pdf/cwpe1539.pdf) 
Abstract  
All things considered, anything up to US $7 trillion of so-called quantitative easing (QE) 
funds has flooded emerging markets since the 2008 global financial crisis.  These funds, 
created to stimulate a recovery in the OECD and to stabilise international financial markets, 
ended up mostly as emerging markets’ corporate bonds and loans (often after being 
leveraged into many multiples of their original value).  They were then either mainly 
invested (Asia), or used (as in Latin America and South Africa) at best to finance economic 
activities which do not enhance productive capacities, such as residential construction, or 
used to finance deficits, M&A, capital flight and all sorts of financial deeds − including as fuel 
for any conceivable asset bubble.  The enquiries of these issues, especially how corporations 
financed their investment, and how much of it took place, were subjects that fascinated Ajit.  
He was the first to find out that corporations in emerging markets relied much more on 
external finance than those in the OECD (where retained profits played a major role).  The 
implication was that they were likely to be even more susceptible to the vicissitudes of 
financial markets − and as these became ever more weird (the almost inevitable outcome of 
hasty deregulation cum excess liquidity), the financial balances of corporate sectors north 
and south of the Equator ended up moving in opposite directions further than ever before.  
This is a key (if not the key) difference between current global financial fragilities and those 
at the onset of the current global financial crisis in 2007.  This highly asymmetric corporate 
balance scenario is part and parcel of such a low interest rate and highly financialised 
environment, as now (among other things) so-called “investors” in search for elusive yields, 
inevitably have to take on more risk, leverage and illiquidity.  And emerging markets have 
always been their markets of last resort.  This is a vital (yet only implicit) ingredient of the 
peculiar ideas behind super-accommodative monetary policy; but the downside is the risk of 
more volatile asset prices (including commodities), and unchartered financial fragilities all 
over.  Closer regulatory scrutiny worldwide, therefore, should have been an intrinsic part of 
such risky reflationary and monetary policies.  But try to get speculators, traders and 
rentiers (or politicians in need of donations) to understand something, when their (short-
term) earnings, bonuses, share options and corporate-sponsored retirement plans depend 
on them not understanding it.  The stakes for emerging markets’ corporations, their 
economies, financial markets and wider society (and everybody else in the world for that 
matter) could scarcely be higher − but unfortunately these huge new challenges occur at the 
worst possible time, as our social imagination has seldom been so barren.  
Key words: Ajit Singh; Asia; corporate bonds and loans; emerging markets; financial crisis 
and liberalisation; financial fragilities; ideology; Keynes; Kindleberger; Latin America; 
leverage; neo-liberal economic reforms; Quantitative Easing; Systemic market failure.  
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1 This paper is written in honour of Ajit Singh, my amigo and Cambridge colleague for over 
30 years, who died last June. 
2 Emeritus; also research faculty at the Universities of Santiago and Valparaíso.  I would 
like to thank Geoff Harcourt, Alan Hughes, Jonathan Di John, Esteban Pérez, Ignês Sodré, 
and Robert Wade for their valuable suggestions.  
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Insanity is doing the same thing over and over again  
and expecting different results. 
Albert Einstein 
 
 
Among the many subjects that always fascinated Ajit, one that always stood out 
was the question of how corporations financed their investment.  While for the 
most part his work examined the role of finance in corporate behaviour of 
industrialised countries, in “Corporate Financial Structures in Developing 
Countries” (written in 1992 with Javed Hamid and others3) he looked at how 
corporations in developing countries financed growth.  Ajit found a consistent 
pattern: these corporations relied much more on external finance than those in 
industrial economies (where retained profits played a major role).  The 
implication was that corporations in emerging markets were likely to be even 
more susceptible to the vicissitudes of financial markets − and as these 
vicissitudes became ever more weird (the almost inevitable outcome of reckless 
deregulation cum excess liquidity), Ajit and I often talked about the subject.4  
At its core, this issue relates to the fact that although corporations 
generate a large proportion of investment all over the world − e.g., in the G6, 
corporations currently account for between half (Italy) and just over two-thirds 
(Japan) of gross investment − they tend to finance this in very different forms 
north and south of the Equator.  In emerging markets, corporations (in 
aggregate) tend to absorb the net savings of other sectors of their economies 
(including the foreign one), thereby helping to generate both aggregate demand 
and a dynamic supply.  In the developed world, however, retained profits not only 
tend to finance corporate investment to a much larger extent, but currently − as 
profits are so strong and real investment so remarkably weak − the corporate 
sector has bizarrely become a net financer of the other sectors of the economy 
(such as the public and household ones).5  Not surprisingly, absurdly high levels 
of debt are (so far) easily financed, including huge public sector deficits and 
household debts.6  So is practically any type of mergers and acquisitions (M&A), 
                                          
3 Singh, et al. (1992).  
4 Among the many issues that drew our attention one that was the subject of one of our 
last conversations was the relentless increase of ‘short-termism’; for example, in the UK 
and US the average holding periods of shares has fallen from around 6 years in the 1950s 
to less than 6 months today (Haldane, 2015).  
5 On the extraordinarily high profit rates in the US, see endnote 1. 
6 The public sector debt of just eight OECD countries (general government) increased by 
more than US$ 20 trillion in the 7-year period after mid-2007.  And the global liabilities of 
private households have increased by nearly US$10 trillion since then.  For the former see 
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share buybacks, executive pay, bonuses, political contributions, and corporate-
sponsored retirement plans (in the US, retirement assets of just 100 CEOs add up 
to as much as the entire retirement account savings of more than 116 million 
people at the bottom of the pay scale).7  Furthermore, the combination of low 
levels of corporate investment and rising corporate net saving is one of the main 
factors driving the growing mismatch in financial markets between abundant 
liquidity and a relative shortage of solid financial assets − making the ease of 
performing a transaction in a hollow security or instrument the trademark of the 
current process of “financialisation”.8  
The Fed has finally acknowledged its bewilderment at the existence of 
these combined trends in the G7 (swelling corporate net lending vs. dwindling 
investment rates), stating that “… from a surprisingly weak starting point, 
corporate investment in many of the G7 economies started falling below our 
models' predictions”.9  (Not a bad candidate for the understatement of the year!).  
However, for those working in the general area of the dynamics leading to 
growing financialisation (like Ajit, Wynne Godley and myself), these bizarre twin-
trends in the North were already patently clear well before the 2007/2008 global 
financial crisis, as was the perverse logic leading to them in a world ruled by the 
tyranny of finance and an ever growing urge for inequality (an obsession now 
bordering on the pathological).  It was also blatantly clear to us that these 
combined trends could be key contributors to a major debacle − which was likely 
to happen sooner rather than later, as financial markets became convinced that 
they could keep extracting an ever increasing amount of rents from the real 
economy in a sustainable way.  Wishful thinking was rapidly becoming 
delusional.10  
                                                                                                                       
World Bank (2015); and for the latter, Allianz (2015). 
7 See Anderson and Klinger (2015).  On the current record levels of merges and 
acquisitions, see endnote 2.   
8 We are back to a scenario in which almost any financial asset would do − so much so 
that sub-prime mortgages now look comparatively reasonable (as there was at least some 
collateral).  For example, there is now even a fast-growing market for sub-prime loans for 
hair extensions − no credit, no hair, no problema for a hair loan!  Perhaps this new 
interest in hair weaves in some quarters is related to some sort of identification with 
Donald Trump!  (http://detroit.suntimes.com/det-news/7/77/230829/no-credit-no-
problem-detroit-store-has-loans-for-hair-weaves).  Also, one of the biggest lenders of 
subprime mortgages in the run-up to the 2008 housing bust has just announced that is 
back in business.  (http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-12-11/ally-returns-to-
mortgage-business-two-years-after-total-exit)  
9 Gruber and Kamin (2015).  
10 Goldman Sachs’ CEO famous remark: “I’m just a banker doing God’s work”, was one of 
the jewels in the neo-liberal ideology’s crown of the time.  For an early analysis of the 
dynamics leading to the global financial crisis, see Palma (2009); and on the role of 
growing inequality in the build-up of this crisis, Palma (2011).  For the pioneer work of 
Wynne Godley in the general area of “sectoral financial balances”, see 
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One key difference between current global financial fragilities and those at 
the onset of the 2007/2008 global financial crisis is that the financial balances of 
the corporate sector in the industrialised countries and in emerging markets have 
now moved in opposite directions even further − in fact, probably further than 
ever before!  (Please don’t claim again, and again wrongly, that no one saw what 
was coming…).   
In the case of corporate balances in the North, while in the early 2000s 
they were (as one would anticipate) in negative territory − approximately minus 
4% of GDP in the US, and about minus 5% in most countries of the Eurozone and 
in the UK −, now corporate net saving runs up to (plus) 8% of GDP (Japan), and 
at about (plus) 3% of GDP in the rest of the G6 (except for France).11  Not the 
soundest scenario for sustainable productivity-growth!   
In the case of emerging markets economies, however, the corporate net-
saving move has been in the opposite direction − and this has not been the result 
(as sometimes in the past) of falling profit rates swelling corporate deficits.12  In 
these markets, the debt to equity ratio has shot up from just above 70% in 2007 
to nearly 110% this year13 − in fact, according to IMF data in emerging markets 
economies the ratio of total liabilities to total equity during this period has risen 
even further14.  And this took place despite stock markets bubbles all over the 
place after their collapse in 2008 − as the opportunity cost of capital has fallen to 
next to nothing, and liquidity is so plentiful, speculators have been able to bid up 
not just the share prices of anything in the OECD, but also in developing 
countries.  As a result, almost everywhere in the World stocks are now more 
overvalued than in 2000 or 2007 no matter how you look at things.15  In fact, few 
hypotheses in Economics have proved to be such a load of wishful thinking as 
Fama’s in this respect − such as his key point that if financial markets get 
misaligned, they will always ‘self-correct’.  Smart market players would simply 
force stock prices to become rational by doing exactly the opposite of what they 
                                                                                                                       
http://www.levyinstitute.org/publications/wynne-godley.  For an acknowledgement of its 
relevance, http://blogs.ft.com/martin-wolf-exchange/2012/07/19/the-balance-sheet-
recession-in-the-us/. 
11 Few statistics speak as loud as these regarding the insanity of the current scenario of 
financialisation − especially in its never-ending capacity to generate profitable alternatives 
to real investment.  
12 This was the case in East Asia before the 1997 financial crisis (see, for example, Palma, 
2012a).  The above quoted study (Inker, 2015) concludes that “[in emerging markets] 
profitability measures all seem to be saying that today’s earnings are about normal.”  
(While in the US his best estimate was that profit margins were about 24% better than 
normal).  See also IMF (2015).  
13 https://www.msci.com/emerging-markets 
14 See IMF (2015), Figure 3.2, p. 85.  
15 See, for example, Inker (2015).   
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actually do in real life: take the other side of trades if prices begin to develop a 
pattern (as this is bound to have no substance).  In other words, for the efficient 
market theology a ‘rational surfer’ is not the one that has fun riding waves, but 
the one that gets drowned trying to create undertows.16  Indeed, we now know 
that Alan Greenspan was even against tightening regulation against financial 
fraud, ‘as rational markets can take care of themselves’.17  
Therefore, to understand the fall in emerging markets’ returns to equity 
during this period (these dropped from about 17% to 11%, respectively18) one 
has to look at changes in the denominator rather than in the numerator.   
However, it is important to note that there is a huge difference among 
developing countries in this respect − one that is often overlooked19: while in 
many Asian countries too much borrowing has been led by high levels of real 
investment both in the build-up of too much capacity (the products of which are 
now flooding markets at a time when demand is faltering), and in a remarkable 
property boom, in Latin America an exploding corporate debt has not been 
associated with increasing capacity-enhancing expenditures.  In fact, the share of 
investment in GDP has not only remained low and relatively stagnant, but also a 
large proportion of that disappointing investment rate has been made up by 
residential construction (which, no matter how many positive effects it may have, 
it does not enlarge productive-capacities).  Indeed, even through the recent 
period of export bonanza, real investment per worker in Latin America (in 
constant dollars) has been on average systematically below its 1980 pre-
economic-reforms level − and it is not as though that level was particularly high 
to begin with!20  In the meantime, in this period (1980-2014) China has increased 
this statistic by a multiple of 26 − and India by 5; Korea by 4; Singapore and 
                                          
16 Gene Fama’s idealisation of financial markets efficiency, especially de-regulated ones − 
as in his ‘efficient capital markets’ hypothesis − surely helps find an answer to Krugman’s 
question: How did economists get it so wrong? 
(http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/06/magazine/06Economic-t.html?_r=0).  And this was 
clearly evident well before the award of his Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences 
(which is as much a Nobel Price in Economics as unregulated and over-liquid financial 
markets are perfectly efficient!); see http://ciperchile.cl/2013/10/21/premio-nobel-de-
economia-teatro-puro-teatro/) 
17 He allegedly told Brooksley Born, Chair of the Commodities Futures Trading 
Commission, that there was no need for a law against fraud (although he now claims that 
“he does not remember” that conversation…).  
(http://www.forbes.com/sites/eamonnfingleton/2013/06/06/alan-greenspans-epic-
incompetence-another-shoe-drops/) 
18  http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/46f42c36-8965-11e5-90de-
f44762bf9896.html#axzz3rjS3sytj 
19 As in the Financial Times article just quoted. 
20 For data on investment, WDI (2015); for employment, GGDC (2015).  For an analysis of 
this phenomenon, Palma (2010).  
 6
Malaysia by 3; Vietnam by 3 just since 1994 (the first year for which data are 
available), and so on.21  
In fact, in Latin America, the rate of investment has struggled to reach 
even 20% of GDP since the beginning of economic reforms − less than half 
China’s recent levels; meanwhile, its GDP-share of household consumption, 
mostly the result of the exuberance of the few and the ever-increasing levels of 
debt of the many, is currently twice that of China.  Needless to say, both China 
and Latin America (and none more than Brazil) now urgently need to rebalance 
their growth, but in opposite directions.22   
As emerging markets are now beginning to feel the nasty effects of a 
credit crunch, this raises an intriguing question: in these circumstances, as their 
corporations are beginning to find it difficult to repay loans and raise fresh cash, 
is it better for one’s corporate sector to be caught with over-capacity or just over-
weight?  With white elephants, or trapped with financial assets that may end up 
not being worth the paper they’re written on?  I once asked Ajit this question; no 
prizes for guessing what his answer was…  
The almost inevitable slow-down of China (as already suggested, an 
economy desperately needing to put some order into its corporate finances, as 
well as to re-orient its growth towards the domestic market) has caused jitters in 
international financial markets.  One of the many concerns relates to the fact that 
over-liquid and often imaginatively-challenged financial markets had sought 
refuge in commodities because of the shortages of minimally solid financial assets 
in which to park excess liquidity.  Unwinding from this has been a major 
contributor to the collapse in global commodity prices.  In emerging markets this 
has hurt corporations across the board and had brought many of their resource-
rich economies to a sudden halt − and some, like Brazil, into deep recession.  
And if over the past few months markets have become gripped by China's 
economic outlook (as well as by the Fed’s “will it or won't it?”), a now increasingly 
volatile political landscape (especially in Europe) could threaten even further the 
                                          
21 In Latin America the exception is Chile, but only during its 12-year growth period (1986 
to 1998), when its investment per worker trebled (although the latter level was only twice 
that already achieved in 1970).  In Brazil and Mexico, meanwhile, their 2013 level (last 
year that data are available) is actually 20% below their 1980 one − and in the case of 
Mexico, this is so despite having had one of the highest (if not the highest) levels of FDI 
per worker in the World.  For the whole of Latin America, this statistic fell (on average) 
10% during this 33-year period (i.e., in constant 2005 US$, it fell from US$ 4,377 in 1980 
to US$ 3,924 in 2013 − commodity price boom and all).  See Ibid.  
22 As is well known, when international financial markets were reassured in 2003 by the 
strikingly neo-liberal orientation of the Lula government, it gave rise to a period of 
international elation with Brazil − not by chance this country was awarded almost 
simultaneously the men’s Football World Cup and the Olympics.  At the time, few seemed 
to care whether Brazil’s economic growth could be sustainable (see Palma, 2012b). 
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stability of international financial markets.23  In fact, 2016 may prove to be a year 
in which politics comes to the fore as a major driver of risk in (already highly 
fragile) international financial markets.  
In emerging markets however, the main force behind current financial 
fragilities is the unprecedented surge of financial flows from the North − the 
already mentioned interconnecting factor between the different drifts of financial 
balances of both corporate sectors.  According to the Bank for International 
Settlements, between 2009 and 2014, overall credit provided overseas in US 
dollars through bank loans and bonds hit the staggering amount of nearly US$ 10 
trillion24.  The irony of it all is that exploding emerging markets’ borrowing was 
fuelled by funds that were initially released by the Fed’s (QE) programme 
(followed later by the Bank of England, the European Central Bank, the Bank of 
Japan and others).  By some estimates, (and all things considered) anything up 
to US$ 7 trillion of QE funds flooded emerging markets since the Fed began 
buying bonds in 2008.25  Those funds, allegedly created to stimulate a recovery in 
the high-income OECD economies and to stabilise international financial markets, 
ended up in significant amounts as emerging markets’ corporate debt (often after 
being leveraged into many multiples of their original value).26  Although all these 
numbers are very tentative estimates27, what we know is that these funds were 
vast, and that they were either mostly invested (Asia), or used (as in Latin 
America and South Africa, Africa’s honorary Latin-American country) mostly to 
finance capital flight, a variety of deficits, M&A and all sorts of financial deeds − 
including as fuel for any conceivable asset bubble.  That is, the little that was 
used productively there was concentrated in residential construction, and in the 
financing of a build-up of productive capacities in commodity extraction − 
although, due to lack of industrial policies, corporations were often merely 
interested in investing in activities that would allow commodities to reach only the 
                                          
23 On the plethora of political problems hitting Europe at the moment, see endnote 3.  
24 See, for example, Avdjiev, et al. (2014); for the latest estimate, see McCauley, et al. 
(2015).   
25 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/46f42c36-8965-11e5-90de-
f44762bf9896.html#axzz3rjS3sytj; see also other above quoted references, and 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2010-11-17/bernanke-s-cheap-money-stimulus-
spurs-corporate-investment-outside-u-s-. 
26  According to another source, the recent outburst in emerging markets US dollar debt 
was “…comparable … to any of the biggest cross-border lending sprees of the past two 
centuries”. 
(http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/ambroseevans_pritchard/11300454/Fed-
calls-time-on-5.7-trillion-of-emerging-market-dollar-debt.html) 
27 See, for example, Lavigne et al. (2014); and the already mentioned McCauley, et al. 
(2015).   
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bare minimum level of processing required for exports.  What a difference with 
what was going on in Asia!  
In the words of the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, when 
all's said and done QE was stubbornly going its own way:  
“In my darkest moments I have begun to wonder if the monetary accommodation 
we have already engineered might … be working in the wrong places. Far too many 
of the large corporations I survey … report that the most effective way to deploy 
cheap money raised in the current bond markets or in the form of loans from 
banks, beyond buying in stock or expanding dividends, is to invest it abroad … ”. 
(http://www.dallasfed.org/news/speeches/fisher/2010/fs101007.cfm)  
 
A truly remarkable statement.  QE was not just working “in the wrong places”, 
but also for those large corporations it seems that the only way to deploy cheap 
and abundant QE money was just by ‘buying in stock, expanding dividends, or 
speculating with it abroad’.  The idea that the extra liquidity generated by QE 
could conceivably be used to finance investment at home − i.e., to be used to 
expand own productive capacities − does not even appear to be an option for 
those corporations.28  How could ‘just do with it something socially useful at 
home’ possibly compete with shares buybacks, ever-expanding dividends, or 
riding the gravy trains of easy opportunities opened up by emerging markets.  In 
the case of Asia (especially East Asia), these highly profitable opportunities are 
usually opened up by their almost uncanny predisposition towards the reality 
principle − with its insistence on high investment rates, its remarkable 
technological absorption capabilities, and its strong macro-policy stands.  In the 
case of Latin America, however, the gravy trains of easy opportunities are usually 
opened up not by our predisposition to the reality principle, but rather our innate 
tendency towards the pleasure principle − so easily satisfied by an endless supply 
of low-hanging fruits such as effortless asset bubbles, highly profitable market 
failures, vast rents from natural resources, timid institutions, an obliging macro, a 
considerate progressive intelligencia (with a disturbingly high tolerance for 
inequality, an attitude that has always stink of meekness towards vested interests 
− but one that can be highly rewarding), and an instinctive aversion to 
competition or any other form of capitalist compulsion.  Who needs sticks where 
there is such a plentiful supply of carrots for the few!   
In both regions, of course, speculators from the North can also get on 
board of this gravy train by profiting from all sorts of opportunities opened up by 
                                          
28 Well, we already knew that the availability of finance is not what determines investment!  
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corrupt behaviour.  What a weird world economy is being built in memory of 
Reagan and Thatcher − especially in the Anglo-Iberian worlds!29  
There were several routes by which QE money emigrated to emerging 
markets.  One involved the Fed buying US Treasury bonds from financial 
corporations such as pension funds, which hold them as long-term assets with 
low, but dependable yields.  By doing this, the Fed raised bond prices and 
lowered yields, sending restless asset managers in search of higher yields (such 
as in emerging markets’ corporate debt).  And as I have discussed elsewhere in 
detail, when international financial markets find themselves with excess liquidity, 
developing countries usually become their ‘financial market of last resort’.30 
At the same time, by buying so many Treasuries from commercial banks, 
the Fed pushed them to lend at least part of their newly acquired cash to hedge 
funds that like to play edgy games with emerging markets’ money-market 
instruments.31  Worse still, some of that cash was also lent to leveraged funds 
that use their leverage capabilities to increase the (often highly destabilising) 
ability of speculators to navigate shifting emerging markets with bull and bear 
flexibility.32  Sometimes this highly leveraged dubious cash would seek high 
returns by scalping emerging markets with activities such as the carry trade 
(borrowing in currencies where interest rates are low and placing the proceeds 
where they are high).  These, of course, could only remain one-way bets while 
these large amounts of volatile funds could also push exchange rates in emerging 
markets to overvalue, and while other automatic "destabilisers" work in their 
favour.33  But, inevitably, this will eventually go wrong when the law of gravity 
finally begins to dominate34  − and when this happens, as the title of my above 
quoted paper on the global financial crisis emphasises, what we often witness is 
“the revenge of the market on the rentiers”.   
                                          
29 On these issues, see Palma (2014). 
30 See, for example, Palma (2012a).  
31 Credit mutual funds have also benefited, tripling in size since the 2008 financial crisis 
(http://www.bbc.com/news/business-34901904).   
32 Thomas Jefferson was surely right when he said: “I sincerely believe … that banking 
institutions are more dangerous to our liberties than standing armies”.  “… Ought we then 
to give further growth to an institution so powerful, so hostile?"  
(http://etext.virginia.edu/jefferson/quotations/jeff1325.htm).  Perhaps the only positive 
externality of current financial markets volatility is that it has brought down many (at best 
socially-useless, at worst highly destabilising) hedge funds.  
(http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e1346df2-9cd3-11e5-8ce1-
f6219b685d74.html#axzz3tfWcjSsy).  
33  Emerging markets’ corporations also issued bonds in international financial markets to 
jump onto this bandwagon.   
34 Perhaps this kind of scenario may be already too close for comfort as more than US$ 1 
trillion of US corporate debt alone has been downgraded this year as defaults climb to 
post-crisis highs, underlining fears that the credit cycle has entered its final innings.  
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And “markets” now have quite a lot to revenge themselves for, as 
“… corporate debt of nonfinancial firms across major emerging market economies 
[has] increased from about US$ 4 trillion in 2004 to well over US$ 18 trillion in 
2014. The average emerging market corporate debt-to-GDP ratio has also grown 
by 26 percentage points in the same period …”.  (IMF, 2015)   
 
Is there anyone still left of the house of neo-liberalism who thinks that this 
corporate debt outburst makes economic sense − in the sense that this could 
possibly be the outcome of something that resembles some sort of ‘equilibrium’ 
(even a sub-optimal one, but one that could be at least sustainable)?  That is, 
something that could resemble an efficient outcome of the free market-interplay 
of rational and intelligent agents?  In fact, these days there does not seem to be 
even many practitioners (who have benefitted from it) who think so.  According 
to one, “There's a worry that [currently] there's no buyers of corporate bonds and 
that on any given day everyone might want to sell”.  And according to another, 
“There's always this nagging doubt that the money may leave [emerging 
corporate bonds markets] as quickly as it arrived; [so], the potential for volatility 
if there is a real reason to rush for the exit is much, much greater”.  “[There is 
even the risk that] corporate bond fund managers … may now have to keep hold 
of [these bonds] until maturity”.  (What could be more unreasonable!).  And 
when there is such market turbulence, not surprisingly, people ask the obvious: 
“it begs the question: who is the dealer of last resort?"35   
Well, in today’s world, with so many States fully endorsing the principle of 
‘subsidiarity’ − a principle that has its real roots in the fact that subsidies, 
subsidies, and further subsidies are all that governments can think of at the 
moment when having to address a financial markets’ folly − there is an easy 
answer to the question of who is going to be the dealer of last resort: “Asset 
Management chief executive Martin Gilbert called for central banks to consider 
stepping in should the corporate bond market collapse, thus performing a similar 
role to its lender of last resort for banks”.  In fact, speculators, rentiers and 
traders need not worry, as the European Central Bank is already planning to add 
corporate bonds to its massive (and ever-expanding) QE package − in the same 
way as in its last meeting it already added municipal bonds.  In fact, market 
players have reported that this is what bond markets have already priced in.  And 
these days “investors” are rarely disappointed, as central bankers now seem to 
think that “not upsetting the markets” is the only policy-tool left for them…   
                                          
35 For the above quotes, see http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1730a378-8df0-11e5-a549-
b89a1dfede9b.html#axzz3sxtfuNDA; and http://www.bbc.com/news/business-34901904.  
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And in terms of the problems of domestic absorption in emerging markets 
economies of foreign funds brought in by corporate bonds and loans, their Central 
Banks, by taking these foreign assets on to their balance sheets, also had to 
create liabilities.  So they printed money, and sometimes sold bonds to sterilise.  
But when fresh cash made its way into the local banking system, they could then 
lend more − in fact, they could lend multiples of those amounts (about four times 
in Brazil, eight times in Malaysia and 10 times in Chile).  
Also, foreign direct investment was another route for QE to find its way 
into emerging markets.  Last year, 40% of Brazil’s FDI took the form of intra-
company loans.  In China, about the same percentage took the form of “other 
capital flows”, including intra-company loans and payments.36  As opposed to 
Latin America (and South Africa), in Asia some of this did end up increasing 
productive capacities significantly, but inevitably some just added liquidity to 
China’s shady shadow banking.  And in the case of Latin America, the analysis 
above helps to understand why US$ 2 trillion of FDI inflows since the “Brady 
Bonds” − especially the latest surge of FDI since QE − has had little or no impact 
on investment rates (see Figure 1).   
FIGURE 1 
 
●  a = the Fed began buying bonds in 2008.  3-year moving averages.  
●  Sources: WDI (2015); ECLAC (2015); and WEO (2015).  
                                          
36 Avdjiev, et al. (2014). 
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Not much evidence of over-capacities being built here (as in Asia) by this 
tsunami of (so-called) foreign direct “investment” − nor by the massive build-up 
of corporate debts.  In fact, according to the economic complexity index (ECI), 
given the levels of income per capita, Latin American economies are now among 
the least diversified in the World − and none as much as Chile.37   
Although these huge FDI inflows (as well as foreign bank loans, and 
portfolio inflows − with its wide range of asset classes, such as equity securities, 
government bonds, corporate bonds, financial derivatives, real estate investment 
trusts, exchange-traded funds, mutual funds, certificates of deposit and so on) 
may have had a negligible positive impact on investment rates, they did have, 
however, a major negative one on the current account of the balance of 
payments.  Taking into account only those associated with FDI since 2002, when 
commodity prices began their meteoric rise, a full US$ 1 trillion has left the 
countries of the region in the form of profit repatriation by multinationals − as 
they tend to behave like Latino-corporations the moment they cross the Equator 
(see Figure 2).  
 FIGURE 2 
 
●  BP = balance of payments definition.  a = the Fed began buying bonds in 2008.  3-year 
moving averages.  
●  Sources: ECLAC (2015); and WEO (2015).   
                                          
37 This is so if one excludes oil-economies.  See http://atlas.cid.harvard.edu/rankings/.  
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In the case of Chile, for example, in the 12-year period between 2002 and 
2014 profit repatriation by FDI, mostly copper multinationals, was seven times 
higher than during the previous, similar length one (1990-2002) − US$ 186 
billion and US$ 27 billion, respectively (constant 2010 dollars).  In fact, profit 
repatriation by FDI in this 12-year period (2002-2014) was six times higher than 
that of the whole previous 33-year period (1980-2002).  In terms of the GDP of 
each interval, while the figure for the former is equivalent to 8% of that 
aggregate, the one for 1980-2002 is just 2% of GDP.   
From another perspective, the amount that FDI took out of Chile in the 
form of profit repatriation only between 2002 and 2014 was larger than the stock 
of the entire retirement account savings of all Chilean workers (about 10 million 
people) that have little choice but to be affiliated to the (draconian) private 
pension fund system (AFPs) − about U$ 190 billion vs. about US$ 160 billion, 
respectively).   
If that is a rather daunting thought, I wish I could spare you this next one: 
most of that massive profit repatriation was due to copper multinationals taking 
out of Chile in just 12 years an amount larger than the whole of the Marshall Plan 
− the one in which the United States gave US$13 billion (approximately US$ 130 
billion in current dollar value) in economic support to help rebuild Western 
European economies after the end of Second World War.  And all that for the 
great inconvenience of exporting copper concentrates − a mud with a metal 
content of about only 30%, which is the result of a rudimentary flotation of the 
pulverized raw copper ore. So, why bothering to do much processing at source if 
one can manage these colossal returns for doing so little?  All this gives a whole 
new meaning (and one that is a bit more magical-realist) to that concept “picking 
the low-hanging fruit”.  
And, in turn, the high levels and huge volatilities of portfolio inflows, not 
least since QE, brought in a remarkable (and gratuitous) extra degree of 
macroeconomic uncertainty, especially to exchange rates.  See Figure 3.  
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FIGURE 3 
 
●  a = the Fed began buying bonds in 2008.  
●  Sources: ECLAC (2015); and WEO (2015).  
 
In sum, in the 7-year period since the Fed began buying bonds in 2008, FDI 
inflows to Latin America doubled (to US$ 1 trillion) vis-à-vis the levels reached 
during the previous similar-length period (one that was also part of the so-called 
commodity price super-cycle).  So did, of course, profit repatriation by FDI (to 
US$ 700 billion).  In fact, Figure 1 indicates, oddly enough, that investment 
actually fell as a percentage of GDP during this QE-related tsunami of FDI.  In 
turn, during the reign of QE, portfolio inflows jumped by a factor of nearly 6 (to 
US$ 650 billion) compared to the previous similar-length period (all figures in 
constant 2010 dollars).  Not the customary behaviour of international financial 
markets towards a dynamically-diffident developing region at a time of a global 
financial crisis.  And the inevitable question is always the same: what did Latin 
America do with these additional funds?  Figure 1 hints that in this milk and 
honey world of low-hanging fruits, not that much was done with them that could 
be considered socially useful…  What have we done in my part of the world to 
deserve this endless loop!  
All in all, and as a percentage of GDP, in emerging markets economies 
private sector debt (corporations and households) is estimated to be already well 
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over 100%38.  Therefore, it is now greater than in developed markets in the build-
up to the global financial crisis.  In fact, many of the commodity producing 
economies (emerging or otherwise) simply assumed that the commodity-price 
boom would last forever (of course, “this time it’s different”)39 − and they 
adjusted their permanent income expectations accordingly40.  As a result, they 
mortgaged their expected higher income streams by embarking on domestic 
credit booms that have left many of these countries with serious debt hangovers.  
For example, five of the better-known commodity exporters increased their 
private bank debt from 50% of GDP to 80% during the years of the commodity-
price boom41.  In fact, according to the Institute of International Finance (IIF), 
when all's said and done overall emerging market debt is now probably fast 
approaching 200% of GDP42.  
Thus, the so-called “Keynesian” QE-policy from the Fed and other central 
banks − Keynes must be turning in his grave at the crude exploitation of his 
name, as QE in the US, and later in the EU, was (and in the latter case still is) 
basically an attempt by monetary authorities to keep financial dinosaurs on life 
support − has left a legacy of all sorts of financial fragilities in the South, as well 
as over-capacities in Asia, and a highly futile over-financialisation in Latin 
America and South Africa, from which it will take many years to unwind.43   
From this perspective, the paradox is that QE was designed to help reduce 
systemic risks in the world economy − and specifically to facilitate an orderly 
process of deleveraging in industrialised countries.  Instead, it has made possible 
the build up of a huge debt-bubble in emerging markets in both cross-border 
lending, and in bank lending − with the former now at serious risk of currency 
mismatches (especially concerning corporations operating in non-tradable 
activities), and the latter in one of liquidity mismatches.  Accordingly, a credit 
crunch could mean a corporate dollar-debt crisis due to the former, or a domestic 
banking one due to the latter.  In fact, bank lending conditions in emerging 
                                          
38 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/46f42c36-8965-11e5-90de-
f44762bf9896.html#axzz3rjS3sytj  
39 http://ciperchile.cl/2013/03/25/la-economia-chilena-como-el-elefante-se-balancea-
sobre-la-tela-de-una-arana/ 
40 For example, during the four-year period of the last Chilean government (2010-2014), 
consumption not only absorbed the additional resources that were kept at home, but it 
even jumped from 71% of GDP to nearly 76% of it.  Under this kind of scenario, populism 
can even resemble prosperity.  See 
http://si3.bcentral.cl/siete/secure/cuadros/home.aspx?Idioma=en-US. 
41 http://www.nikkoam.co.nz/articles/2015/07/commodity-producers-year 
42 https://www.iif.com/publication/html-publication/weekly-insight-waiting-game 
43  For how QE has also left all sorts of market dislocations in the North, see endnote 4.   
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markets have deteriorated so sharply that some of the IIF’s measures are at their 
worst levels since they began monitoring conditions in these markets.44  
As a result, heavily indebted emerging markets’ corporations, and the 
banks exposed to them, are at risk of falling into a vicious circle of low 
profitability, increasing non-performing loans, and tighter credit conditions.  
Stating the obvious, we should not expect a demand-led recovery of the global 
economy to come from this end of the world anytime soon.45   
In actual fact, we should not expect a demand-led recovery to come from 
any part of the world unless a robust set of linkages between financial markets 
and the real economy is re-established (à la FDR); as Keynes said at the time of 
the 1930s crash,  
“… there cannot be a real recovery, in my judgment, until the idea of lenders and 
the idea of productive borrowers are brought together again…  Seldom in modern 
history has the gap between the two been so wide and so difficult to bridge.”46 
 
As the late Carlos Díaz-Alejandro (Ajit’s great friend and mine) once said − 
following the intellectual lead of our common mentor, Charles Kindleberger − 
“Good-Bye Financial Repression, Hello Financial Crash.”   
This is especially true in a negative real interest rate environment, as 
speculators, in their desperate search for elusive yields, inevitably have to take 
on more risk, more leverage and more illiquidity.  This is precisely a vital (yet 
implicit) ingredient of the peculiar ideas behind super-accommodative monetary 
policy; but the downside (among many) is that this policy − leading speculators 
to take on more risk, leverage and illiquidity − is likely to bring more volatile 
asset prices globally (including commodities), and more unchartered financial 
fragilities all over.  Closer regulatory scrutiny worldwide, therefore, should have 
been an intrinsic part of such risky reflationary policy.  But try to get speculators, 
traders and rentiers (or politicians in need of donations for that matter) to 
understand something, when their (short-term) earnings, bonuses, share options 
and corporate-sponsored retirement plans depend on them not understanding it.  
 My own part of the world, Latin America, tends (unfortunately, and as 
usual) to be the worst in this respect − with its close relative in southern Africa 
not far behind.  In their neoliberal model, the hub of accumulation has been 
located in speculative finance, and in exploiting market failures, privileges, lack of 
                                          
44 https://www.iif.com/publication/html-publication/weekly-insight-waiting-game  
45 On the demise of the BRICs, see endnote 5.  
46 Keynes, J.M. (1930).  See also Mazzucato and Perez (2014).  In the words of a 
monetary regulator (the Chair of the UK’s Financial Service Authority): “‘Swollen’ financial 
markets tend to produce socially useless products and innovations”. 
 17
competition, timid institutions, and the helping hand of a so-called progressive 
intelligencia (full of conflicts of interest − and one who would always blink first in 
a political staring game with those at the top).  Only such a context can reward 
“investors” (once upon a time “to invest” meant something to do with adding 
productive capacities), traffickers of political influence and insider trading so 
generously, and with such impunity.  How else could the top one percent in Chile 
end up appropriating more than 30% of national income?47  And there is little 
doubt that this context also punishes real investment, productive diversification, 
technological absorption and industrialisation.  In fact, in Latin America 
productivity has hardly increased since pre-economic reforms − it is almost 
difficult to believe, but (with the customary cycles and significant diversities, such 
as Chile in the 1990s) output per worker in the region has been on average 
stagnant since 1980 (with an annual rate of growth of just 0.1% for this 35-year 
period48).  And since 1990, it has grown by just 0.9% per year.  In the meantime, 
in China these statistics reach 7.1% and 8.2% per annum, respectively; in Korea 
at 4.2% and 3.5%; in Taiwan at 3.9% and 3.4%; in Vietnam at 3.5% and 4.4%; 
in India at 3.4% and 4.1%; in Thailand at 3.7% and 3.3%; and so on.49   
So, again, the unavoidable question arises: Where has all that exploding 
corporate debt gone in Latin America?  Especially in countries like Chile, which 
now ranks number three among all emerging markets economies in terms of 
swelling corporate debts since 2007 as percentage of GDP (only after China and 
Turkey).  And in Brazil (which now ranks number four)?  And in Peru (number 
six)?  And in Mexico (number eight), or Colombia (number 12)?  In the case of 
Chile, the increase in corporate debt was equivalent to about 20 percentage 
points of GDP; in Brazil and Peru about 15 points; and in Mexico and Colombia 
about 10 points50.  In the meantime, if private investment (despite a commodity-
price boom and easy finance due to QE liquidity) managed to raise much above 
15% of GDP, the capitalist élites of the region started experiencing feelings of 
vertigo.51  And what about those US$ 2 trillion of FDI flows that have come in 
since the onset of economic reforms in 1990 − and especially since the Fed began 
buying bonds in 2008?  All this is a stark reminder of how little still we really 
                                          
47 Figueroa and López (2013).  
48 Again, for the Guinness Book of World Records, section ‘countries not in political 
turmoil’.  
49 GGDC (2015). 
50 See IMF (2015).  
51 During the period of rapidly rising corporate debt in Latin America (i.e., since 2004), 
private investment averaged just 15.9% of GDP (see ECLAC, 2013; arithmetic mean of 19 
countries.  Data available until 2010.  In Latin America, data on private investment are 
notoriously difficult to obtain.  See also WEO, 2015).  
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understand about what has been happening inside Latin America since our 
(remarkably unsophisticated and highly corrupt52) neo-liberal economic reforms.53  
Not least due to the (somewhat garciamarquean) intricacies involved.  
Paraphrasing Einstein, perhaps in Latin America difficulties in understanding have 
to do − more than anywhere else in the world − with the fact that unfortunately 
not everything that can be counted counts (for this understanding), and little that 
counts can be counted.  
And for those who still believe that total factor productivity (TFP) is the 
key, in Chile, for example, a country that is so often highlighted as the best 
performer of the region, the average annual rate of growth of this statistic since 
1995 has actually been nil!54  At least in the case of Chile this has been so for a 
period of ‘only’ 20 years, as the average TFP-growth rate for the whole region has 
been zero for much longer − in fact, for the 34-year long period since 1981 (i.e., 
the end of the previous development strategy of State-led industrialisation).55  
And the prospects ahead for the region do not look very promising either.  
Evidence like this sometime makes me wonder how those who carried out the 
particular set of economic reforms that has characterised the region since − and 
take this statistic (TFP) so seriously, as my neo-liberal colleagues − can they 
sleep at night.  There is little doubt that during the 1980s there was a lot of re-
engineering needed in the region as far as development strategy was concerned, 
but the chosen one seems to have had more to do with passions of pure ideology 
(and conflicts of interests) rather than with social reality.  
Not surprisingly, in a context such as that of Latin America inequality is as 
much a twin of inefficiency as the law of gravity is of the apple.  Emerging 
markets that are such a paradise for (domestic and foreign) rentiers, speculators 
and traders can only be a purgatory for their real economies and consumers.  
(Douglas North’s last major contribution to Economics, its “limited access order” 
notion, attempts to look a bit in this direction56).   
                                          
52 See, for example, Mönckeberg (2001); and http://ciperchile.cl/2015/11/03/el-tpp-o-
como-ceder-soberania-por-secretaria/.  
53 Should we just keep pretending that “there was no alternative” − or “TINA” − to them?  
And regarding what we still do not understand about Latin America’s remarkable poor 
performance, it reminds me of that famous quote − perhaps the hallmark of an era: “there 
are things that we now know we don't know. But there are also things we do not know we 
don't know”…   
54 CORFO (2013).  
55 ECALC (2013).  
56 North et al. (2007).  For him and his co-authors, “A common feature of limited access 
orders is that political elites divide up control of the economy, each getting some share of 
the rents. … [but] adequate stability of the rents and thus of the social order requires 
limiting access and competition − hence a social order with a fundamentally different logic 
than the open access order [of advanced industrial countries]”.  For an analysis of North’s 
 19
 In sum − and unfortunately − Ajit was right; corporations in developing 
countries tend to be even more susceptible to the vicissitudes of international 
finance than their counterparts in the developed world.  In fact, and not 
surprisingly, unregulated and over-liquid international financial markets have 
proved to be as destructive and self-destructive as anything Freud could have 
ever imagined − especially in emerging markets, where domestic financial 
markets are particularly “thin”.  The idolization of finance − i.e., the worship of a 
thing: money − has dominated the desire to create life-producing economic 
activities; and rent-seeking accumulation has dictated the path of other creative, 
innovative activities − and has inevitably placed a strait-jacket on them.57  
Ajit would had surely agreed with me that it is certainly time to make a 
margin call to the guardians of financial de-regulation − i.e., it’s about time to 
ask them to put a lot more substance into their arguments.  The stakes for 
emerging markets’ corporations, their real economies and financial markets, and 
wider society (and everybody else in the world for that matter) could scarcely be 
higher − as (quoting the great Portuguese poet Camoes) we are now definitely 
“em mares nunca dantes navegados”.58   
But unfortunately (and as opposed to that era that brought us a good deal 
of civilisation − the one characterised by the New Deal, The General Theory, the 
Bretton Woods agreements, The Marshall Plan, the British National Health Service 
and the Welfare State), this new challenges are happening at the worst possible 
time, as our current social imagination (north and south of the Equator) has 
seldom been so barren.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                       
ideas in the Brazilian context, see Di John (forthcoming).  
57 For how economic theory has followed a relatively similar path with its switch towards 
the idolatry of a ritual (mathematics), see http://ciperchile.cl/2013/11/12/por-que-la-
economia-ortodoxa-transfirio-su-obsesion-por-un-concepto-mercado-a-un-ritual-
matematicas/. 
58 Across never before sailed seas.  
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Endnotes 
 
1.-  A recent study of profitability in the US concludes: “The clearest driver of the 
surprisingly good profitability [in the US] is the rise in corporate profits as a percent of 
GDP …  This series had a … mean-reverting look to it [as] there had been no obvious trend 
for the close to 50 years of data, despite plenty of good times and bad in the interim. And 
the appearance of long-term stability still seemed strong as late as the early 2000s. [After 
that] the new highs of profitability … [were related to] the housing boom and bubble in risk 
assets. Afterwards profits … [fell] through the old average in the financial crisis, although 
not to the lows we saw in prior recessions. And since then, … we saw them rise well 
beyond anything the U.S. has ever seen. On this measure, profitability … is higher than 
any point in history before 2010.  …  Our best estimate is that profit margins are about 
24% better than normal.  …  From a macroeconomic perspective, maintaining such high 
levels of profitability [in the US] in the face of low investment rates implies ever-increasing 
wealth inequality in this country.”  (Inker, 2015) 
 
2.-  In terms of current trends of global mergers and acquisitions, according to Thomson 
Reuters the total value of these operations so far this year (mid-November) amounts to 
more than US$ 4.2 trillion (and counting).  This surpasses the previous record set in 2007 
on the eve of the financial crisis.  The latest one, Pfizer’s US$ 160 billion takeover of 
Allergan, the third-largest deal in history, will create the world’s biggest pharmaceutical 
group by sales.  It will also save Pfizer at least US$ 21 billion in its tax bills by allowing it 
to move the combined group to Ireland (as Allergan, once based in the US, is now already 
a Dublin-based corporation).  This “inversion” will also free more than US$ 130 billion of 
offshore earnings that Pfizer has shielded from the US authorities.  The ease with which 
companies can shift profits like this to low-tax countries has been estimated to cost up to 
US$ 240 billions in lost tax revenues (a black hole described euphemistically by the OECD 
as “base erosion and profits shifting”).  Pfizer has also announced the beginning of a 
process of share buybacks that is expected to reach huge proportions.  And following the 
divergent trends mentioned above − ever higher profits (especially after-tax ones) 
associated with ever more mediocre levels of investment − Pfizer also announced a large 
cutback in R&D spending (including, among several other closures, one of a facility in 
Cambridge, which focuses on R&D in pain therapies).  This reminds me of what Einstein 
once said: “Only two things are infinite: the universe and human stupidity” − “although 
[he added later] I'm not sure about the universe”.  For the above Pfizer scheme (including 
why the transaction will be structured as a reverse merger, with Allergan technically 
buying Pfizer), see http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c65488bc-91db-11e5-bd82-
c1fb87bef7af.html#axzz3sJ8r5bPJ; and http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7ee22f58-99cd-11e5-
987b-d6cdef1b205c.html#axzz3tG3bXaZm 
 
3.-  Among the plethora of political problems hitting Europe at the moment the better 
known ones are the dread of ISIL’s vicious-style terrorism (which can only get worse given 
Europe’s rather mechanical bombing-response), the current tsunami of refugees, the re-
emergence of fascists-leaning political parties, the growing likelihood of a Brexit (British 
exit from the European Union), the ever expanding debt of the Eurozone periphery, the 
(increasingly forgotten) crisis in Ukraine, and Volkswagen’s crimes and misdemeanours − 
as well as those of so many other large corporations, as now those of the real economy 
start mirroring the behaviour of their relatives in financial markets (as if saying “look at 
me; I'm the same as you.  I feel the same way and share the same attitudes”).  To these 
one should add, as Robert Wade does, the Eurozone fiscal compact treaty, signed by in 
2012.  This treaty “tightly restricts the fiscal policy space of member governments, which 
have already given up national control of the key prices of interest rates and exchange 
rates”.  (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/91d496e4-66b7-11e5-a57f-21b88f7d973f.html).  
This treaty, a fiscal straightjacket, will make sure that the Eurozone continues to have 
recessionary pressures, and their politically destabilising effects, for the foreseeable future. 
 
4.-  QE has also left all sort of market dislocations in the North as well; for example, on 
the eve of the Fed’s likely rate increase, the first one since 2006, the Financial Times 
reports that tighter policy will probably mean even lower bond yields, “reflecting a world 
fraught with risk and economies still struggling to recover, burdened by previous excesses” 
(http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/23232c52-9a7d-11e5-a5c1-
ca5db4add713.html#axzz3tt87kK4I).  Also, the latest BIS (2015) points to a rather odd 
price relationship in the fixed income market; US dollar swap spreads (i.e., the difference 
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between the rate on the fixed leg of a swap and the corresponding Treasury yield) have 
turned negative in the US.  Given that counterparties in derivatives markets, typically 
banks, are less creditworthy than the government, swap rates are normally higher than 
Treasury yields because of the additional risk premium.  Hence, the negative spreads point 
to a possible dislocation − or maybe someone knows something that we don’t!  Or, 
perhaps, it is simply that, as Warren Buffett remarked, “When you combine ignorance and 
leverage, you get some pretty interesting results”.  
 
5.-  Those looking for symbolism can turn to this month’s decision by Goldman Sachs to 
end its long-running BRIC- soap opera (Goldman coined the BRIC concept in 2001), as the 
excitement generated by the concept had waned and died.  So, it pulled the plug on its 
nine-year-old product, the BRIC fund (for Brazil, Russia, India and China), and merged it 
into its broader emerging markets fund (as it had lost 88% of its assets since a 2010 
peak).  For example, in terms of exchange-traded funds’ returns divergence, the four BRIC 
countries have had nearly 100 percentage points variation over the last three years − with 
India up 43% while Brazil is down 52% (http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-
11-04/etf-investors-are-unbundling-emerging-markets).  No much evidence of a BRIC 
‘asset class’ here.  So, R.I.P. BRIC.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 22
Bibliography 
 
Allianz Global Wealth Report (2015).  Available at 
https://www.allianz.com/en/economic_research/publications/specials_fmo
/agwr15e.html?search.query=Global%20OR%20Wealth%20OR%20Report
%20OR%202015&search.filter=-_contentType:editorial.  
Anderson, S., and S. Klinger, (2015).  ‘A Tale of Two Retirements’, available at 
http://www.ips-dc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Two-Retirements-
final-pdf.pdf. 
Avdjiev, S., M. Chui and H. Song Shin (2014). ‘Non-financial corporations from 
emerging market economies and capital flows´, BIS Quarterly Review, 
December.  
BIS (2015). Quarterly Review, December.  
CORFO (2013). ‘Evolución de la PTF en Chile’, Boletín Trimestral No. 7.  Available 
at 
http://www.corfo.cl/downloadfile.aspx?CodSistema=20020129172812&Co
dContenido=20111230117312&CodArchivo=20141104145405.  
Di John, J. (forthcoming). Manufacturing Brazil: political order and industrial 
progress, Oxford University Press.  
ECLAC (2013). ‘La inversión y el ahorro en América Latina: nuevos rasgos 
estilizados, requerimientos para el crecimiento y elementos de una 
estrategia para fortalecer su financiamiento’, by S. Manuelito and L. F. 
Jiménez.  Available at http://www.cepal.org/es/publicaciones/5364-la-
inversion-y-el-ahorro-en-america-latina-nuevos-rasgos-estilizados.  
ECLAC (2015). Cepalstat Databases.  Available at 
http://interwp.cepal.org/sisgen/ConsultaIntegrada.asp?idIndicador=2050&
idioma=i.  
Figueroa, E. and R. López (2013). ‘La ‘parte del león’: Nuevas estimaciones de la 
participación de los súper ricos en el ingreso de Chile’, Series Documentos 
de Trabajo, Vol. 379, March.  
GGDC (2015). Total Economy Database.  Available at https://www.conference-
board.org/data/economydatabase/.   
Gruber, J. W., and S. B. Kamin (2015). ‘The Corporate Saving Glut in the 
Aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis’, FRB International Finance 
Discussion Paper No. 1150.  Available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2686986.  
Haldane, A. G. (2015). ‘Who owns a company?’, University of Edinburgh 
Corporate Finance Conference.  Available at 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/2015/833.a
spx.  
IMF (2015). Global Financial Stability Report. Vulnerabilities, Legacies, and Policy 
Challenges. Risks Rotating to Emerging Markets, October 2015.  Available 
at http://www.imf.org/External/Pubs/FT/GFSR/2015/02/index.htm.  
Inker, B. (2015). ‘Just How Bad Is Emerging, and How Good Is the U.S.?’, GMO 
Quarterly Letter, 3Q.  
Keynes, J. M. (1930). ‘The Grand Slump of 1930’, in Essays in Persuasion, vol. XI 
(1972), Macmillan.  
Lavigne, R., S. Sarker and G. Vasishtha (2014). ‘Spillover Effects of Quantitative 
Easing on Emerging-Market Economies’, Bank of Canada Review, Autumn. 
 23
Mazzucato, M. and C. Perez (2014). ‘Innovation as Growth Policy: The challenge 
for Europe´, SPRU Working Paper Series 2014-13.  Available at 
https://www.sussex.ac.uk/webteam/gateway/file.php?name=2014-13-
swps-mazzucato-perez.pdf&site=25.  
Mönckeberg, O. (2001).  El saqueo de los grupos económicos al Estado de Chile, 
Ediciones B (2001), and Penguin Random House (2015).  
McCauley, R. N., P. McGuire and V. Sushko (2015). ‘Dollar credit to emerging 
market economies’, in BIS (2015).  
North, D. C., J. J. Wallis, S. B. Webb and B. R. Weingast (2013). ‘Limited Access 
Orders in the Developing World: A new approach to the problems of 
development’, Policy Research Working Papers, World Bank.  Available at 
http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/abs/10.1596/1813-9450-4359.  
Palma, J. G. (2009). ‘The Revenge of the market on the rentiers: why neo-liberal 
reports of the end of history turned out to be premature’, Cambridge 
Journal of Economics 33(4).  For an extended version, 
http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/research/repec/cam/pdf/cwpe0927.pdf. 
Palma, J. G. (2010). ‘Why has productivity growth stagnated in most Latin 
American countries since the neo-liberal reforms?’ In The Oxford 
Handbook of Latin American Economics, edited by José Antonio Ocampo 
and Jaime Ros, Oxford University Press.  For an extended version, 
http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/research/repec/cam/pdf/cwpe1030.pdf.  
Palma, J. G. (2011). ‘Homogeneous middles vs. heterogeneous tails, and the end 
of the ‘Inverted-U’: the share of the rich is what it’s all about’, 
Development and Change 42(1).  For an extended version, 
http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/research/repec/cam/pdf/cwpe1111.pdf. 
Palma, J. G. (2012). ‘How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid 
financial markets led Latin America to “two and a half” cycles of mania, 
panic and crash’, in G. Epstein and M. H. Wolfson, The Handbook on the 
Political Economy of Financial Crises, Oxford University Press, 2012.  
Available at 
http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/research/repec/cam/pdf/cwpe1201.pdf.  
Palma, J. G. (2014).  ‘Latin America’s social imagination since 1950. From one 
type of ‘absolute certainties’ to another — with no (far more creative) 
‘uncomfortable uncertainties’ in sight’.  Available at 
http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/research/repec/cam/pdf/cwpe1416.pdf.  A 
shorter version of this paper was published in J. Ghosh, R. Kattel and E. S. 
Reinert, The Handbook of Alternative Theories of Economic Development, 
Elgar, 2015.  
Singh, A., H. Javed, S. Bahram, and N. Yoichi (1992). ‘Corporate financial 
structures in developing countries’, International Finance Corporation 
Technical Papers, No 1, The World Bank.  Available at 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1992/05/440084/corporate-
financial-structures-developing-countries.  
WDI (2015). World Development Indicators.  Available at 
http://data.worldbank.org/products/wdi.  
WEO (2015).  IMF-World Economic Outlook.  Available at 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2015/02/weodata/index.aspx.  
World Bank (2015).  Available at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/EXTQPUB
SECDEBT/0,,contentMDK:22707085~menuPK:7409959~pagePK:6416844
5~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:7404473,00.html. 
